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RACIAL EQUALITY IN JOBS AND UNIONS, 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINlNG, AND THE 
BURGER COURTt 
William B. Gould* 
Makin' a road 
For the rich old white men 
To sweep over in their big cars 
And leave me standin' here. 
Langston Hughes1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IN the foreseeable future, the Supreme Court of the United States will be called upon to resolve many disputes resulting from the 
existence of racial inequality in the collective bargaining process 
and from the lack of full integration in union leadership. Those 
disputes will arise primarily because black wor-kers are now chal-
lenging employers' and unions' practices which have hitherto been 
thought to be protected under the rubric of free collective bargain-
ing. 
No one can deny that there is a new-found willingness among 
black workers to challenge previously accepted practices. Yet some 
courts seem unaware of that developing militancy. The recent deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers v. NLRB,2 provides 
an example. In that case, the court, speaking through Judge Skelly 
Wright, held that an employer's "invidious discrimination on ac-
count of race or national origin,"3 was impermissible under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Judge Wright observed that 
such discrimination has a twofold effect: it leads to apathy on the 
part of those who are discriminated against, and it results in an "un-
justified clash of interests"4 between black workers and white work-
ers and thereby considerably reduces the effectiveness of the bargain-
t This Article is based on a speech presented by the author to the Labor Law 
Section of the American Bar Association at Dallas, Texas, on August 11, 1969. 
• Professor of Law, ,vayne State University. A.B. 1958, University of Rhode 
Island; LL.B. 1961, Cornell University; Graduate Study 1962-1963, London School of 
Economics.-Ed. 
I. Florida Road Workers, in MODERN AMERICAN POETRY 594 (L. Untermeyer ed.1950). 
2. 70 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7) I, cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3173 (U.S. 
Nov. IO, 1969). On remand from the court of appeals, the NLRB ordered a rehearing. 
Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 72 L.R.R.M. 1251 (Oct. 9, 1969). 
3. 70 L.R.R.M. at 2497. 
4. 70 L.R.R.M. at 2495. 
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ing unit. Undoubtedly, some will object to the result reached in that 
case on the ground that the NLRA was not intended to be a fair 
employment practices statute.5 But there is another significant flaw 
in the opinion. That flaw is the attempt to equate the effects of 
racial inequality in public education-effects that existed in the 
situation in Brown v. Board of Education6-with the effects of 
racial discrimination in employment. Such an equation is not at all 
in step with current events. Thus, Judge Skelly Wright's conclusion, 
in Packinghouse Workers that "racial discrimination creates in its 
victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting 
their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination"7 is argu-
ably anachronistic. 
The problem with such an observation is that it comes at a time 
·when the black worker is anything but docile. Indeed, employers and 
unions in such metropolitan areas as Detroit and Chicago are well 
aware of the new militancy of Negro employees who are frustrated 
by what they regard as discriminatory or poor working conditions 
and by the failure of the almost lily-white union leadership to 
correct those conditions. 
The explosiveness of the situation can be seen not only in the 
frustrations of the black workers, but also in the increasingly or-
ganized hostility of those white workers who are just a rung above 
the Negro on the economic ladder, and who constitute what is 
probably the most alienated group in our society today. Moreover, 
the measures which have been taken to assist the cause of racial 
equality in employment, and which appear threatening to the white 
workers, have been ineffective to eliminate the practices which 
arouse the blacks. Indeed, Congress has thus far failed to provide 
5. This argument first appeared with respect to the question whether a failure 
of a union to fulfill its duty of fair representation of its members constitutes an un-
fair labor practice. But despite the strong objections of Chairman McCulloch and 
Member Fanning, a majority of the National Labor Relations Board have never been 
troubled either by the argument presented in the text or by the absence of legislative 
history supporting the conclusion that a breach of the duty of fair representation 
constitutes an unfair labor practice; and they have come to that conclusion. See 
United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
837 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 
172 (2d Cir. 1963). But there are two differences between the duty found by Judge 
Wright in Packinghouse Workers and the duty of fair representation. First, when 
Congress passed the 1947 amendments to the NLRA, it was presumably aware that 
the Supreme Court had devised a judicial doctrine of fair representation. Second, the 
duty of fair representation is a logical corollary to the principle of the union as ex• 
clusive bargaining representative. Hence, there is a stronger argument for sustaining 
the administratively fashioned duty of fair representation than there is for upholding 
Judge Wright's attempt to make racial discrimination an unfair labor practice for an 
employer. 
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7. 70 L.R.R.M. at 2495. 
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the appropriations and the enforcement authority which are necessary 
if the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is to 
enhance the likelihood that racial equality in jobs will become a 
reality for blacks. As EEOC Chairman Brown recently said, "[t]he 
only thing we can do if we find discrimination is to sit down with 
the employer or with the union and negotiate or conciliate the 
particular case .... It is almost impossible for us to do the job that 
has to be done unless and until we get cease-and-desist powers."8 
Thus, the net effect of the remedial steps that have been taken 
has been to increase the frustrations of both groups. While increased 
hostility on the part of white workers may be an inevitable side-
effect of curing racially discriminatory employment practices, the 
situation would be considerably less explosive if the cure could elim-
inate the frustrations of at least the black workers. 
When the rules of the collective bargaining game were being 
created and developed under the NLRA, discrimination in employ-
ment was still being openly engaged in; in fact, Congress did not 
address itself to the problem until 1964.9 But when Congress did 
enact title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 (title VII), and 
when it voted appropriations for the Executive Order which the Act 
took cognizance of,11 it operated under the assumption that in a 
substantial number of instances black workers were not being dealt 
with fairly in the collective bargaining process. Had it not thought 
so, the detailed debate12 and the comprehensive legislation would 
have been unnecessary. Accordingly, if the national labor law is to 
reflect current congressional views of collective bargaining activities 
insofar as race is concerned, then the NLRA, and the assumptions 
and practices which have developed under it, must be accommodated 
to the objectives of civil rights legislation. But until the principle 
of equality for black and white workers is effectuated in the labor-
8. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1969, at 30, col. I. However, Chairman Brown's views on 
the matter have apparently changed. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, at I, col. 5. See also 
Jons AND CIVIL RIGHTS (Prepared for tlxe U.S. Civil Rights Commission by tlxe Brookings 
Institution, 1969). 
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-(h) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000(d)-l(e), -l(g) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964). 
11. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 comp.), as amended, Exec. 
Order No. 11,162, 3 C.F.R. 215 (1964-1965 comp.). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 recog-
nized tlxis order in § 709(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1964). Executive Order No. 10,925 
has been superceded by Exec. Order No. II,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 comp.), as 
amended, Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967 comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 
IV, 1965-1968). 
12. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 11,719 (1964) (remarks of Senator Tower); IIO CONG. 
REc. 12,595 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark). See generally H.R. REP. No. 914, 88tlx 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. REP. No. 872, 88tlx Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
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management context, it is the duty of the courts, operating under 
both the NLRA and title VII, to root out the past practices and 
to fashion remedies which mirror the more recently developed 
policy against discrimination. 
The Supreme Court has taken such action in many similar areas. 
It has demonstrated an unflagging hostility to racial discrimination 
in voting, education, selection of juries, and housing. With respect 
to voting, the Court has held that eligibility requirements which 
were not applied to whites when discrimination was previously 
practiced must be set aside in order to root out the remnants of 
past inequality.13 The Court's inclination to re_ad civil rights stat-
utes and constitutional guarantees of equality expansively is also 
typified by its treatment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Allen 
v. State Board of Elections.14 In that case, the legislature had en-
acted laws which altered the previously existing election procedures 
in three ways: they changed the basis of county elections from 
district-wide voting to at-large voting; they provided that some 
county officials were to be appointed rather than elected; and they 
created more difficulties for potential third party candidates than 
had previously existed. Despite damaging indications in the legisla-
tive history of the Act, the Court held that these laws had to be 
submitted for approval either to the Attorney General of the United 
States or to the District Court for the District of Columbia, since 
they constituted a "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, 
or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting,''1" as con-
templated by the Voting Rights Act. The Court stated: "The 
Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, 
state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their 
right to vote because of their race."16 
In education, the Court has announced that the test for com-
pliance with the fourteenth amendment is whether the school 
board's desegregation plan in fact accomplishes the stated objec-
tive-integration of the races.17 Thus, in order to devise an effective 
13. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). 
14. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
16. 393 U.S. at 565. 
17. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 
391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Commrs., 391 U.S. 450 (1968). The Court's 
most recent decision on school desegregation is Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of 
Educ., 90 S. Ct. 14 (1969), in which the Court found that Brown's requirement of 
desegregation with "all deliberate speed" was no longer constitutionally permissible. 
90 S. Ct. at 15-16. The Court then ordered the school districts involved in the case to 
begin desegregation "immediately." 
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remedy in this area, race must be consciously taken into account.18 
Discrimination in the jury system has been measured to some ex-
tent, although perhaps not as much as it should be, by statistics.19 
Finally, with respect to housing, the Court recently held in Jones 
v. Alfred H. Mayer Company20 that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
prohibits racial discrimination in housing, and it indicated that 
the Constitution is especially concerned with remedying the vestiges 
of slavery for the American Negro.21 
But the Warren Court never had the opportunity to inter-
pret the provisions of title VII or to accommodate the NLRA 
to the legally recognized problems faced by racial minorities.22 In-
deed, the Court's last holding of major significance in this area was 
Steele v. Louisville b Nashville Railway Company23 which is a 
quarter of a century old and thus antedates Chief Justice Warren's 
appointment by almost ten years. Therefore, for better or worse, 
it is the Burger Court which will have the chance to shape the law 
of employment discrimination. That Court will be faced with few 
18. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), afjd. 
with modifications on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966) (en bane), cert. denied 
sub nom. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). But see 
Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 
MICH. L. REV. 1553, 1603-04 (1969). 
19. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 
(1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Aikins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); 
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
20. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. 
L. REv. 470. Compare Dobbins v. Local 212, !BEW, 69 L.R.R.M. 2313 (S.D. Ohio 
1968), with Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2886 
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 1969), and Harrison v. American Can Co., 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. 
I (S.D. Ala. July 8, 1969), on the applicability of Jones to racial discrimination in em-
ployment. See also Gould, The Emerging Law Against Racial Discrimination in Em-
ployment, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 359, 376-78 (1969). 
21. 392 U.S. at 437-44. 
22. See generally M. SOVERN, LEGAL REsrRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT (1966); Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Rail-
way Labor and National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 167 (1968); 
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 563 (1962). 
23. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In that case, the Court held that the Railway Labor Act 
imposed on a union acting as the exclusive bargaining agent for a class of employ-
ees the duty to represent all employees without discrimination because of their race. 
This has become known as the doctrine of fair representation. See text accompanying 
notes 33-34 infra. Of course, there have been a number of fair representation cases 
decided by the Court subsequent to Steele in both a racial and a nonracial context, 
and some of them were decided by the Warren Court. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 
(1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); 
Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1956); Ford v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Gra-
ham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). See generally St. Antoine, Judicial 
Valour and the Warren Court's Labor Decisions, 67 MxcH. L. REv. 317 (1968), on the 
role of the Warren Court and labor law. 
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problems, if any, which will be more important than the question 
of the precise limitations on discriminatory employment practices. 
On those decisions will hinge the ability of Negro workers to com-
pete economically with whites and to educate their children effec-
tively. I£ the decisions interpret civil rights law expansively, the 
cost pressures of the black protest will be imposed upon employers; 
and the business community may perforce become more interested 
in correcting the many other ailments of the ghetto. 
In dealing with the problems of employment discrimination, 
the Burger Court will have to face several new and major issues. 
This Article is concerned with two of the most important of those 
issues. The first is whether the present requirement that workers 
seek redress of their grievances through the exclusive representation 
of the union is applicable to victims of racial discrimination; and 
if not, what other remedies should be available to those workers. 
The second is whether quotas and ratios based on race are permis-
sible; and if so, whether it is required that they be used to integrate 
union leadership after a merger of two previously segregated unions. 
While the main focus of this Article is on these problems, it will 
also deal briefly with the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gaston County v. United States24 on remedies for existing discrim-
inatory employment practices resulting from past segregation. 
II. THE FAILURE OF THE UNION AS EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING 
REPRESENTATIVE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 
AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES 
Both the NLRA25 and the Railway Labor Act26 provide that 
a union selected by a majority of the workers within a particular 
craft or industrial unit is the exclusive bargaining agent for each 
worker in that unit, whether or not he is a member of the elected 
union. In interpreting those statutory provisions, the Supreme Court 
has held that individual employment contracts can be contravened 
by the union's exclusive authority, and that an employer is pro-
hibited by statute from negotiating with individual employees 
rather than with the exclusive a,gent.27 The neat orderliness of 
those principles, coupled with a faith in the benefits of the arbi-
24. 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
25. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). 
26. 45 U.S.C. § 152(fourth) (1964). 
27. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); J.I. Case Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
28. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Corp., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
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tration process,28 convinced the Warren Court that proceeding 
to arbitration is the union's prerogative unless the union has en-
gaged in bad faith conduct,29 and that an individual worker cannot 
obtain a judicial hearing of a complaint until he has exhausted any 
negotiated grievance-arbitration machinery which is applicable to 
his situation.30 Moreover, since resort to the judiciary £or the adjudi-
cation of contract claims would undermine arbitration, the em-
ployee in most instances cannot have his case reviewed on the 
merits.31 These principles of law, however, were articulated in a 
nonracial context, and they should, ideally, have no adverse impact 
on the interests of workers of minority races. 
In Steele v. Louisville &- Nashville Railway Company,32 the 
Supreme Court imposed on unions a duty of fair representation.33 
In that case, the Court held that a union acting as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of a craft or class of employees has the obliga-
tion to represent all employees in the craft without discrimination on 
the basis of their race, and that the courts have jurisdiction to pro-
tect the minority of the craft or class from a violation of that 
obligation.84 Nevertheless, history has shown that the procedures 
requiring workers to seek redress solely through the exclusive rep-
resentative have been inadequate to solve the problems of victims 
of racial discrimination.85 Accordingly, in some situations involving 
racial discrimination against a worker, the Court has abandoned 
its ordinary rules and has allowed the worker to go directly to 
court without first proceeding through the union. Thus, the courts 
have agreed that when a worker alleges racial discrimination, but 
not a contractual violation, exhaustion of the grievance-arbitration 
machinery is not required.36 When both are alleged, however, it 
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
29. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
30. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). 
31. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1968). It is not entirely clear, however, 
whether the Court is addressing itself to union exhaustion or to employee exhaus-
tion when it speaks of exhaustion of contractual remedies and indicates that a worker 
may bring suit against an employer despite the absence of exhaustion in the event 
that the union has breached its duty of fair representation. The requirement is 
probably union exhaustion. 
32. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
33. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
34. 323 U.S. at 199. 
35. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra. 
36. See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2784 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 
1969); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1969), revd. 
on other grounds, 406 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1969); King v. Georgia Power Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 
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is much more doubtful that bypassing the union's procedures will 
be permitted.37 Nonetheless, in Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco 
Railway,38 a case presenting allegations of both racial discrimination 
and contract violation, the Court unanimously held that exhaustion 
is not required when the reactions of union officials plainly indicate 
that the processing of grievances through machinery controlled by 
the union and the employer would be a futile act. In that case, which 
concerned a dispute over seniority and promotions, the Court re-
lied heavily upon the demonstrated failure of the union to respond 
when the plaintiffs had "called upon" it to seek redress. As of this 
date, the question whether a mere allegation of racial discrimination 
and contract violation, without the union hostility demonstrated in 
Glover, permits a plaintiff to bypass privately negotiated arbitration 
procedures has not been answered.39 
The significance of Glover and the need for an extension of the 
doctrine expressed in that case can best be seen by reference to 
the enactment of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title 
VII implicitly recognized both the ineffectiveness of the Steele doc-
trine of fair representation40 and the unwillingness of labor and 
management to take affirmative action against discrimination. By 
enacting that statute, Congress determined that, despite the plaudits 
which American unions and employers had given one another for 
good race relations, and despite the supposed "bulwark" provided 
by Steele and the duty of fair representation,41 legislation was nec-
essary. Yet although some commentators have praised both the craft 
and the industrial unions for their progress after the enactment 
2094 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1967); 
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), revd., 2 FAIR EMPL, 
PRAC. CAS. 121 (7th Cir. Sept. 26, 1969). 
37. See ·waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 71 L.R.R.M. 2886 
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 1969); cf. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding 
Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); Brady v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969). 
38. 393 U.S. 324 (1969). 
39. See note 37 supra. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel ·works of Intl. Harvester Co., 
71 L.R.R.M. 2886 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1969), Glover was distinguished because there was 
no showing of futility. 
40. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra. 
In essence, this is the analysis initially set forth in Gould, Non-Governmental 
Remedies in Employment Discrimination, in ABA IN5rITUTE PROC. ON EQUAL EMPLOY• 
MENT OPPORTUNITY LAW (1969) [reprinted in 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 865 (1969)]. That 
basic theme applies to various aspects of the existing industrial relations system. See 
Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. 
REv. 40 (1969); Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact upon Collective Bar• 
gaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969). 
41. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1968), in which the Warren Court made this 
exaggerated claim. 
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of title VII,42 that progress has, on the whole, been quite insignif-
icant. Developments during the five years since the passage of the 
Act do not support any greater confidence in the handling of racial 
issues at the bargaining table than that expressed by Congress in 
1964. The rise of the black militant, whose logic is sometimes un-
steady and irrational, is evidence of the distance between the white 
leaders of organized labor and the young Negro rank-and-file which 
is not afraid to challenge authority. Thus, it appears that the present 
procedures for handling the grievances of black workers-procedures 
requiring that those workers proceed through their union-are in-
adequate. 
In some cases, the use of the Glover decision will be able to 
cure that inadequacy. Such cases are those in which the conflict 
between the collective agreement and the law clearly demonstrates 
that arbitration through the union. would be inappropriate and 
useless.43 But in situations in which the futility of using established 
arbitration procedures is not clear, other solutions must be sought. 
One possible solution involves an extension of the Glover decision 
to exempt all cases involving racial discrimination from the exhaus-
tion doctrine. 
But if Glover is not so extended, then some other type of protection 
for the Negro worker, who is less than confident about how the 
parties to the bargaining agreement will dispose of his claim, is 
necessary if the exhaustion doctrine is to be upheld as fair. In 
formulating that protection, it is imperative that the minority group 
worker himself become involved in the adjudication of his griev-
ances, and that he have, if he wishes, the assistance of a repre-
sentative who has his trust and confidence, such as a civil rights 
organization or a black worker's committee. Even if Glover is ex-
tended, so that the exhaustion requirement becomes totally in-
applicable to racial discrimination cases, some kind of third party 
involvement should still be available to black workers. That con-
clusion is supported by three considerations. First, the other prin-
cipal avenues for relief-those established by title VII-are heavily 
congested because of a lack of appropriations and because of the 
42. See, e.g., F. RAY MARSHALL &: v. BIGGS, EQUAL .APPRENTICESHIP OPPORTUNITIES: 
THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE AND THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE (1968). Compare id., with 
Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 
RUTGERS L. REV. 465 (1968); Gould, The Negro Revolution and Trade Unionism, 114 
CONG. REc. 24872 (1968); O'Hanlon, The Case Against the Unions, FORTUNE, Jan. 1968, 
at 170. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT OPPDRTUNITY REPORT No. 1 (1967). 
43. Cf. United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 837 (1967): Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 240 (1965). 
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statutory defects alluded to by Chairman Brown.44 Second, while 
the grievant may allege racial discrimination, the heart of the issue 
may be white insensitivity about the conditions of employment 
which are not cognizable either as a violation of a no-discrimination 
clause or as a statutory violation. Third, the availability of third 
party intervention would eliminate any need for resort to the courts, 
and it would thus make possible the use of arbitrators who, as the 
Court so clearly indicated in the Steelworkers trilogy,45 have a good 
deal of expertise to bring to bear on plant grievances of all kinds. 
Thus far, the courts have not looked with favor on the principle 
of third party intervention and have viewed it as an unnecessary 
intrusion on a stable collective relationship. The leading case in 
this area is Acuff v. United Paperworkers46 which did not involve 
consideration of race. In that case, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that wildcat strikers had no right 
to separate representation in an arbitration proceeding because 
there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the union. The 
court reasoned that since the union has almost plenary authority 
to decide whether a grievance is to be pursued to the highest step 
of the conflict-resolution ladder,47 it should also be able to control 
every phase of the grievance procedure, including the question of 
participation in the hearing. 
There is, however, some question as to the continuing validity 
of the Acuff decision, for it is at least arguable that the tendency 
of the Warren Court toward adulation for union-negotiated griev-
ance machinery will not be the pattern of the Burger Court. Fur-
thermore, Vaca v. Sipes48-which initially set the stringent standards 
for establishing a violation of the fair representation duty,49 and thus 
laid the foundation for Acuff-is hardly a balanced opinion. More 
important, the logic of Vaca does not require the result reached in 
Acuff. Indeed, Vaca's reasoning that the union has broad discretion 
to decide whether to go to arbitration does not compel, as the 
court in Acuff apparently thought it did, the conclusion that the 
union has absolute control over the grievance procedure. If the 
court's reasoning in Acuff were sound, it would follow that when-
44. See text accompanying note 8 supra. 
45. See note 28 supra. 
46. 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969). Justice Black was 
of the opinion that certiorari should have been granted. See Fleming, Some Problems 
of Due Process and the Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. R.Ev. 235 
(1961); Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in PROC. OF THE 11TH .ANNUAL l\lEETING, 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES 1 {1958). 
47. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. 
48. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
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ever an employee has a grievance, the union could fashion that 
grievance into whatever form it desired-even one to which the 
employee was unalterably opposed. Finally, in Humphrey v. Moore/10 
Justice White seriously discussed the possible need for third party 
representation and thereby gave credence to the notion that its 
availability is a necessary element in the duty of fair representa-
tion.111 
However, the Court can devise effective arbitral remedies for 
racial discrimination in employment without rejecting either Vaca 
or Acuff. That fact is clear from the approach taken by Justice 
Douglas in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills: 52 
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some 
substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do 
in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of 
expressed statutory mandate. Some will lack expressed statutory 
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of legislation 
and the fashioning of remedies that will effectuate that policy. The 
range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature 
of the problem.113 
Certainly the labor and management practices which gave rise to 
title VII's prohibitions against racial discrimination make pro-
posals for representation of , workers by third parties compatible 
with the Court's instructions in Lincoln Mills~ since civil rights 
legislation dealing with employment practices must be regarded 
as part of the substantive law to which the Court referred. In addi-
tion, the nation has a special obligation to Negro workers-an 
obligation which results from the existence of slavery and from 
the systematic discrimination that followed it. 54 Thus, some form 
of third party involvement is a minimum protection for the black 
worker who desires it and whose grievance alleges both racial dis-
crimination and contract violation. Such a procedure is hardly at 
variance with the principle of exclusivity or with the objective of 
uniformity, since it incorporates the dissidents within the union-
employer structure rather than forcing them out of that structure. 
49. Those standards are discussed in text accompanying notes 29-31 supra. 
50. 375 U.S. 335 (1964). 
51. 375 U.S. at 349. 
52. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
53. 353 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added). 
54. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Developments in the 
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969); Comment, The "New" Thir-
teenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1295 (1969). With 
respect to industrial relations, see Gould, Labor Arbitration Grievances Involving 
Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1969); Gould, Black Power in the Union: 
The Impact upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969). 
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It is therefore much more consistent with the uniformity principle 
than is the procedure allowed in Glover, which permits the cir-
cumvention of the private machinery. 
Third party intervention would be particularly important when 
"disadvantaged" workers are hired, because the employment of 
such persons is likely to lead to disputes over the discharges and 
disciplinary measures that result from absenteeism and poor work 
habits. Such disputes will probably be common in these circum-
stances, because a tradition of inferior housing, poor environment, 
and inadequate education frequently makes adjustment difficult for 
the newly hired black worker, particularly if he has never held a 
long-term job. Moreover, the lack of free or inexpensive transporta-
tion for the worker to his job-site increases the likelihood that he will 
miss numerous days of work.55 Although a dual standard of dis-
cipline for blacks and whites is a possible solution to the problems 
which arise in this area, it is not a satisfactory one. The resentment 
of the white worker who is given a two-day suspension for excessive 
tardiness, while his black counterpart goes unpunished, would know 
no bounds.56 Although that factor normally should not be taken 
into account in civil rights controversies57-even those in the em-
ployment area58-any management operating under such a system 
is likely to have severe morale problems. Furthermore, it would not 
be economically desirable to require employers to ignore absentee-
ism and poor work habits. Indeed, it would be extremely difficult 
for a company which is in competition with other businesses for 
a profit to tolerate practices which impair productivity.59 Thus, 
a dual standard of discipline would probably be an ineffective 
method for dealing with the adjustment problems of a new dis-
advantaged worker. 
A preventive approach is another solution. Under it, labor and 
management would provide temporary help during the period of 
adjustment for the employee who has not previously been exposed 
to the discipline of the work place. But for that solution to be effec-
55. The problem of overly expensive transportation to· work has been a point 
of dispute for some time in the Detroit area. 
56. See St. Antoine, Litigation and Meditation Under Title T'II of tlze Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, in ABA !NsrITUTE PROC. ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY LAW (1969). 
57. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 300 (1955). 
58. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
59. Unfortunately, the situation under discussion here cannot be equated with the 
refusal of Orthodox Jews and Seventh Day Adventists to work at certain times, be• 
cause in those cases the minority is small and thus the harm to the employer 
is slight. To the contrary, in the area of programs to hire the disadvantaged, the 
hope is that the minority will become a sizeable one. 
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tive, unions and employers must be willing to teach new employees 
how to tell time, how to read bus stop signs, and so on; and they 
must also be willing, perhaps, to provide free or inexpensive trans-
portation to work. These efforts require both a substantial ex-
penditure of time and money and a great deal of willingness on 
the part of labor and management, and neither is to be anticipated. 
Indeed, the infrequency with which such assistance has been pro-
vided was pointed out by Saul Wallen: 
[S]ome unions have been willing to negotiate special probationary 
arrangements to apply to their company's hard-core employment 
problems. But this has been far from universal. No data are avail-
able and one can only speculate on the extent to which rigid agree-
ment provisions, drawn for typical labor market conditions, have 
thwarted the recruitment and training of the special population 
that makes up the hard-core unemployed.60 
Since no solution appears to be easy, then, the difficult prac-
tical problems involved in hiring disadvantaged workers are likely 
to lead to discharges and disciplinary measures. Those measures, 
in turn, lead to complex disputes which cannot, or will not, be 
solved either by employers or by unions. Thus, third party repre-
sentation-the "triangular relationship," as one court referred to 
it61-is necessary for the resolution of such disputes. 
III. THE PERMISSIBILITY OF QUOTAS BASED ON RACE AND 
THEIR USE IN INTEGRATING UNION LEADERSHIP 
Nearly twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court 
unanimously decided in Hughes v. Superior Court,62 that the Cal-
ifornia courts could enjoin civil rights picketing which was aimed 
at the alleged practice of job discrimination and which was designed 
to result in the hiring of Negroes in proportion to the Negro pa-
tronage of the picketed establishment. Justice Frankfurter, who 
j 
wrote the opinion; was careful to qualify the Court's holding by 
emphasizing that the injunction was permissible only in light of 
California's good judicial record in dealing with racial discrim-
ination in employment.63 The Hughes opinion contains many de-
fects, but its primary effect was to inhibit race consciousness in 
60. Wallen, Industrial Relations Problems of Employing the Disadvantaged, 
Pnoc. OF THE 22n ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (1969). 
61. United States v. Hayes Intl. Corp., 70 L.R.R.M. 2926 (N.D. Ala. 1968), revd. on 
other grounds, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. 67 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 1969). 
62. 339 U.S. 460 (1950). 
63. 339 U.S. at 463-64. 
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devising remedies for employment discrimination and to encourage 
the labeling of all such attempts as forbidden "quotas." That 
situation is changing now. Outside the labor area, the most notable 
recent instance of a policy reversal is United States v. Montgomery 
County Board of Education.64 In that case, a unanimous Court, 
speaking through Justice Black, held that the use of a "ratio" of 
white to Negro faculty members was an appropriate means of 
dealing with past discrimination in the public school system. The 
Court specifically noted that it was not holding that racially bal-
anced faculties were constitutionally required in all instances; but 
it also rejected the holding of the court of appeals that the ratio 
should be "substantially or approximately" complied with and that 
compliance with the desegregation orders should not be tested solely 
in terms of ratio.65 Although the Supreme Court admitted that the 
ratio would be "troublesome" if it were regarded as an inflexible 
approach which might cause an injustice to the school board, it 
stated that such was not the case in the circumstances before it. 66 
The Court based that conclusion on the district court's careful 
analysis of prior discriminatory practices67 and on the facility with 
which the school board could achieve the required ratio. 
There is a similar trend in the labor area. That trend can be 
seen in the Department of Labor's recent announcement of the 
Revised Philadelphia Plan.68 There the Department took the posi-
tion that an "effective affirmative action program" under the 
President's Executive Order69 requires that certain racially oriented 
factors be considered in determining a definite standard for minor-
ity employment in the better-paid trades in Philadelphia. Those 
standards are (1) the current extent of minority group partic-
ipation in the trade; (2) the availability of minority group persons 
for employment in the trade; (3) the need for training programs 
64. 395 U.S. 225 (1969). 
65. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 400 F.2d I (5th Cir.), afjg. 
289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968). 
66. 395 U.S. at 234-35. 
67. 289 F. Supp. at 649-52. 
68. Department of Labor, Order Requiring Specific Goals for Hiring Minorities 
in Better-Paying Philadelphia Construction Jobs, June 27, 1969; Memorandum from 
Assistant Secretary of Labor Fletcher to Heads of All Agencies, June 27, 1969. 
69. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 comp.), as amended, Exec. 
Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320 (1967 comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968). For a discussion of Executive Order No. 11,246, see Jons AND CIVIL RIGHTS, supra 
note 8; Powers, Federal Procurement and Equal Employment opportunity, 29 LAw &: 
CONTEMP. PROB. 468 (1964). 
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in the area or the need to assure a demand for those who are in 
an existing program or who have recently left one; and (4) the 
impact of the proposed program upon the existing labor force. 
The Department of Labor has argued persuasively that its plan 
is not prohibited by the antipreferential-treatment provision of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 But without regard to the legal 
issues, the very existence of such a plan provides an indication, 
as do some recent court rulings, 71 that the mere thought of a quota 
no longer prevents the implementation of truly effective remedies 
for past discrimination. 
It is unclear, however, whether the principles of race conscious-
ness enunciated in Montgomery County and the Revised Philadel-
phia Plan are pertinent to the critical problem of integrating union 
leadership so that the races may share power equitably. Many of 
the difficulties that were discussed in connection with third party 
intervention and the black workers' distrust of union leadership72 
result from a confrontation between a black rank-and-file and a 
predominantly white union officialdom. The problem of integrating 
union leadership is particularly important when two local unions 
that have been segregated in the past-one all white and the other 
all black-merge as required by title VII.73 Great tension will 
arise after such a merger if Negro local officers are voted out by a 
white majority, especially when past discrimination in employment 
conditions has been engaged in by the white local.74 Can title VII 
be said to require the use of a quota or a ratio in order to insure 
that in these circumstances the minority group will have some 
representation? 
Since it was the white leadership which initially negotiated the 
discriminatory conditions, and which probably imposed the segrega-
tion of the locals, that leadership's unchecked control of the union's 
position after a merger hardly bodes well for a collective bargain-
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964). The Attorney General has approved the Plan. See 
Opinion of Attorney General John N. Mitchell on Legality of Revised Philadelphia 
Plan, DAILY l.AnOR REPORT No. 184, at E-1 (Sept. 23, 1969). 
71. Local 53, Intl. Assn. of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogel, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th 
Cir. 1969); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Weiner v. Cuyahoga 
Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969). 
72. See text accompanying notes 36-45 supra. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964). 
74. Moreover, severe eligibility requirements can often effectively discourage 
newly hired black workers from participating in internal union political activities 
and from electing other blacks to leadership positions. Cf. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel 
& Club Employees, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968); Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 
284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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ing process which is supposed to be fair to the Negro minority. 
If black elected officers are not able to participate in policy judg-
ments, then the union's policy-making body is akin to a malappor-
tioned or gerrymandered legislature. Even more analogous to the 
situation at hand is that which arose in Allen v. State Board of 
Elections.75 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a state which 
is within the coverage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 cannot 
convert its district system of election to an at-large system without 
a declaratory judgment or approval by the Attorney General, be-
cause the proposed conversion might result in a dilution of the 
Negro vote. The Court found that, "[v]oters who are members of a 
racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but 
in a decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change 
could therefore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their 
choice just as would prohibiting some of them from voting."76 Simi-
larly, in the labor situation, when two segregated unions merge and 
black workers become the minority, the merger could cause those 
workers to lose all representation in the union leadership as effec-
tively as would a total prohibition on their right to vote.77 
Some of these issues arose in Chicago Federation of Musicians, 
Local 10 v. American Federation of Musicians.78 In that case, the 
international union proposed to merge a local which was all Negro 
with one which was all white. Its merger plan provided that mem-
bers of the black local would have the right to select a certain num-
ber of local union officials during a transitional period consisting 
of the first six years of the merged local's existence. The white local 
then challenged the international's proposal on two grounds: that 
a trusteeship had been formed in violation of the Landrum-Griffin 
Act,79 and that such a trusteeship, together with the merger pro-
75. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
76. 393 U.S. at 569. 
77. See also note 74 supra. 
78. 57 L.R.R.M. 2227 (N.D. ill. 1964). Cf. Gould, The Negro Revolution and the 
Law of Collective Bargaining, 34 FORDHAM L. REv. 207, 255-57 (1965). In United States 
v. Local 189, United Papermakers, 57 CCH Lab. Cas. 1J 9120 (E.D. La. 1968), a consent 
decree was issued providing that, during a transitional period, formerly segregated 
locals would have separate representation. See also Daye v. Tobacco ·workers, 234 F. 
Supp. 815 (D.D.C. 1964). 
79. 57 L.R.R.M. at 2230. Section 3(h) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. 403(h) 
(1964) defines trusteeship as, "any receivership, trusteeship, or other method of super-
vision or control whereby a labor organization suspends the autonomy otherwise 
available to a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws." When a trusteeship 
is formed, various requirements are imposed upon the labor organization which forms 
it. See Landrum-Griffin Act tit. III, 29 U.S.C. §§ 419-24 (1964). 
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posal, violated title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.80 A federal 
district court rejected those contentions and held that the merger 
arrangement was not improper from a "practical standpoint," since 
the international union was attempting to induce the merger 
through a guarantee of representation to members of the black 
locals.81 Although the court noted that title VII was not effective 
at the time that the suit was filed, it did indicate that, because the 
plan was designed to promote integration and to protect the smaller 
local, the statute was not violated.82 
The Chicago Federation case indicates only that a plan which al-
locates seats to each local is permissible under title VII; it does not 
deal with the question whether the statute can be read to impose 
black representation upon the merged local in certain circumstances. 
But the clear intent of title VII would be undermined if the use 
of subtle devices-such as the voting out of black leaders-to lessen 
the value of the black vote were permitted. As the Allen case demon-
strated in connection with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the use of 
such evasionary measures cannot be allowed.83 Thus, it appears that 
title VII should be read to require some fixed or proportionate 
number of blacks in union leadership positions when the alterna-
tive is complete exclusion. The EEOC apparently accepted that 
type of reasoning, for, by holding in a recent case that title VII 
prohibits the dismissal of a black local's officials by white leadership 
after a merger, 84 it indicated that it will review merger terms. 85 
The problem of using ratios to integrate union leadership will 
80. 57 L.R.R.M. at 2230. Section 703(c) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(!) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate 
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or 
refuse to refer for .:mployment any individual, in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit 
such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an in-
dividual in violation of this section. 
81. 57 L.R.R.M. at 2227. 
82. 57 L.R.R.M. at 2236. 
83. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra. 
84. Case No. NO 7-3-336U, 71 LAB. REL. REP. 339 (EEOC June 18, 1969). 
85. The Commission relied, in part, on the lack of any attempt "to merge the 
staffs of the two unions on a nondiscriminatory basis so as to approximate the 
proportions of membership contributed by the two previously segregated locals." 
71 I.An. REL. REP. at 340. 
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presumably become more intense as the statute's effect becomes 
stronger in dealing with segregation. It is extremely unrealistic to 
believe that the election of white trade unionists who have practiced 
segregation in the past is compatible with the even-handed treatment 
which title VII supposedly contemplates for the plant community. 
Assuming, then, that the statute does require that there be some 
Negro representation, the extent of that required representation and 
the size of the quota or ratio necessary for implementing it depend 
upon the size of the merged local and, perhaps, upon the severity of 
the discrimination previously practiced. It is clear that when the 
EEOC and the courts make judgments of this nature, they must ar-
ticulate them on an ad hoc basis, in order to provide the kind of 
flexibility contained in both Montgomery County and the Philadel-
phia Plan. 
Required representation in leadership is hardly inconsistent with 
the Landrum-Griffin Act, since such a requirement simply adheres 
to the democratic choice of the employees in each local union. Fur-
thermore, required integrated leadership is a necessary step, because 
the alternative to it, black separatism, is not a feasible, let alone de-
sirable, objective in this country. If a merger of uvo segregated lo-
cals is allowed to dilute existing black power in the unions, there 
will surely be industrial strife of a racial nature which is antithetical 
to the policies of the NLRA;86 and the circumstances of that dispute 
will be bound to favor the rhetoric of the separatists. Thus, the 
color line in unions, as well as in jobs, must be erased, and integrated 
leadership must be ensured by an active and compulsory use of 
quotas and ratios. 
IV. GASTON COUNTY AND THE GRANTING OF 
COMPENSATORY SENIORITY AND TRAINING 
While it is clear that black leadership in elected policy-making 
positions at both the international87 and local level is a sine qua 
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202(a), (b), 203 (1964). 
87. On an international level, the problem is that district lines are drawn on a 
regional basis, and Negroes are in a minority in each region, even in unions having 
a large Negro membership, such as the United Automobile Workers and the United 
Steelworkers. See Steelworkers Debate Black Representation, 91 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 
16-17 (1968). The UAW circumvented this problem in 1962 by electing to the Board 
a Negro Member-at-Large, Nelson Jack Edwards. More recently, the first Negro Re-
gional Director-Board Member, Marcellius Ivory, was elected. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 
1968, at 11, col. 8; Owens, Negro Is Pilot for 74,000-1\fember UAW Region, Detroit 
Free Press, Aug. 15, 1968, at 2E. See generally Henle, Some Reflections on Militants, 
92 MONTHLY I.An. REv. 20 (1969); Hill, Black Protest and the Struggle for Union 
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non for equality, the matter cannot be considered in a vacuum. Dis-
criminatory employment conditions, which have their origins prior 
to the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, still exist and 
must be completely eliminated. During the past three years this 
subject has been examined in detail, particularly with respect to the 
problems of seniority and advancement, 88 and there is no need to 
reiterate those views here. However, a recent development may shed 
some light on one of the most perplexing of those problems-that 
faced by black workers who have been in an all-black department 
of a plant and who are transferred to a department which had 
previously been all white. In the usual case, those workers will have 
no seniority in their new positions, and they will have little oppor-
tunity for advancement since title VII expressly compels advance-
ment only for those workers who are qualified89 and the newly 
transferred black workers will usually have neither the experience 
nor the seniority to qualify them. Because this situation is the result 
of prior discrimination, it is reasonable to argue that title VII re-
quires unions and management to rectify their previous practices 
by granting the transferred workers compensatory seniority credit 
in their new positions and by providing to those with adequate po-
tential the additional training necessary to qualify them for promo-
tion.90 A recent decision of the Supreme Court, Gaston County v. 
Democracy, I IssuES IN INDUS. SoCY. 19 (1969); Gannon, Black Unionists: Militant Ne-
groes Press for a Stronger 1'oice in the Labor Movement, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1968, 
at I, col. I; Berstein, Fervor of Racial Protest Starting To Press Unions, Denver Post, 
June 15, 1969, § J, at I; Stetson, Negro Members Are Challenging Union Leaders, 
N.Y. Times, June 29, 1969, at 37, col. 2. 
88. See Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967); Gould, Seniority and the 
Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1039 
(1969); Cooper &: Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A 
General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 
1598 (1969); St. Antoine, Litigation and Mediation Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, in ABA INSTITUTE PROC. ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
LAW (1969); Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Senior-
ity Rights, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1532 (1962); Note, Title VII Seniority Discrimination 
and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1260 (1967). See also Local 189, United 
Papermakers v. United States, 71 L.R.R.M. 3070 (5th Cir. July 28, 1969). 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e•2(h) (1964). For discussions of the comparable "affirmative 
action" remedial provision contained in § I0(c) of the NLRA, see St. Antoine, A 
Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1039 (1968); Note, The 
Need for Creative Orders Under Section JO(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 
ll2 U. PA, L. REv. 69 (1963). Section I0(c) authorizes the NLRB "to take such 
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, 
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act] ••.. " 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). 
90. I have made this argument before. See Gould, 13 How. L.J. I (1967), supra 
note 88; Gould, 47 Texas L. Rev. 1039 (1969), supra note 88. 
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United States, 91 in which analogous issues were raised, provides con-
siderable support for that view. 
The question in Gaston County was whether a state could escape 
coverage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because the low number 
of registered voters was attributable to their lack of literacy. The 
Court held that when the illiterate condition of Negro residents is 
attributable to past inferior educational opportunities, the statute 
is applicable and the state's literacy test must be suspended. The 
Court emphasized the relationship between the existing conditions 
and the past inequality: 
It is only reasonable to infer that among black children compelled 
to endure a segregated and inferior education, fewer will achieve 
any given degree of literacy than will be so among their better-edu-
cated white contemporaries. And, on the Government's showing, it 
was certainly proper to infer that Gaston County's inferior Negro 
schools provided many of its Negro residents with subliterate edu-
cation, and gave many others little inducement to enter or remain 
in school.92 
The lesson of Gaston County is that the state cannot take the 
illiterate Negro as it finds him if the state educational facilities are 
responsible for his condition. Much of the current fighting over 
seniority systems and other employment conditions involves very 
similar issues and contentions. Like the state in Gaston County, 
unions and management argue that the denial of compensatory 
seniority and training results from the previous practice of discrim-
ination, and that the denial is not discriminatory in itself; no more 
should be required of them than that they put an end to discrim-
inatory employment practices. That viewpoint deserves no greater 
acceptance by the Burger Court than that which the Warren Court 
gave to the comparable defense in Gaston County. 
In a recent case, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit £ailed to take cognizance of the full implications of Gaston 
County. In that case, Local 189, United Papermakers v. United 
States,93 the court, while accepting the general principle that title 
VII does not permit unions and employers to carry fonvard the ef-
fects of past discrimination in the employment relationship, stated 
in dicta that the statute assists only those Negro workers who have 
"qualifications," that is, existing skills, which qualify them for pro-
motion without training. 94 The court found that "business neces-
91. 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
92. 395 U.S. at 295-96. 
93. 71 L.R.R.M. 3070 (5th Cir. July 28, 1969). 
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sity" would preclude the employment of black workers in jobs for 
which the schools had failed to prepare them.95 But the court did not 
take account of the situation in which unions and employers become 
involved in the discriminatory pattern by placing Negro workers in 
nonpromotable, unskilled jobs. Gaston County indicates that, in 
those circumstances, unions and management, because they were 
originally responsible for the black workers' failure to build up 
seniority in the new department and to receive adequate training 
for advancement, must provide those workers with compensatory 
seniority and training. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As of this date, one cannot know whether the Burger Court will 
permit the Negro worker to be left "standin' there" like Langston 
Hughes' Florida road workers. The Court should not be deceived 
by those who say that the problem of racial discrimination can be 
dealt with effectively through full employment policies, although 
surely effectuation of those policies is the foremost hope of both 
races. But the immediate legal issues involve equity for the black 
worker in terms of the jobs that are available now. Without that 
kind of analysis, we must find ourselves saying with Mrs. Alving in 
Ibsen's Ghosts: "Oh, that perpetual law and order! I often think that 
that is what does all the mischief in this world of ours."96 
The issue, then, is whether the law of racial equality will be made 
applicable to employment in a meaningful sense, that is, whether 
the Court will alter the black worker's current plight which Langston 
Hughes put so well when he said: 
Sure, 
A road helps all of us! 
White folks ride-
And I get to see 'em ride. 
94. 71 L.R.R.M. at 3071. Judge Wisdom's opinion did cite Gaston County for the 
proposition that, in order for title VII to be operative, past discrimination need not 
be unlawful at the time at which it was engaged in. 
95. The court stated: 
Not all "but-for" consequences of :pre-Act racial classification warrant relief un-
der Title VII. For example, unquestionably Negroes, as a class, educated at all-
Negro schools in certain communities have been denied skills available to their 
white contemporaries. That fact would not, however, prevent employers from 
requiring that applicants for secretarial positions know how to type, even though 
this requirement might prevent Negroes from being secretaries . 
. • • Secretaries must be able to type. There is no way around that necessity ••.• 
71 L.R.R.M. at 3076. 
96. H. IBSEN, Ghosts, in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HENRIK IBSEN 220 (1924). 
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I ain't never seen nobody 
Ride so fine before. 
Hey buddy! 
Look at me. 
I'm makin' a road! 97 
97. Florida Road Workers, in MODERN AMERICAN POETRY 594 (L. Untermeyer ed. 
1950). 
